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Abstract
We study information acquisition in a framework characterized by strategic
complementarity or substitutability. Agents’ actions are based on costly public
and private signals, the precisions of which are set by a policy maker and by
private agents, respectively. The policy maker – acting as a von Stackelberg leader
– takes into account that an increase in the precision of public information reduces
the incentives for private information acquisition. The precisions of both the public
and private information available to each agent are shown to depend crucially on the
degree of strategic complementarity or substitutability. We explore the welfare and
policy implications of our results in economies with beauty contests, price setting
complementarities, and negative externalities entailing strategic substitutability.
Keywords: Incomplete information, strategic complementarity, strategic substi-
tutability, welfare
JEL classiﬁcation: C72, D62, D83, E50
1 Introduction
Coordination issues play a key role in many economic environments. Whenever strate-
gic interactions matter, agents’ actions depend not only on their own expectations
about the fundamental state of the economy but also on their expectations about other
agents’ beliefs. These depend in turn on the information agents are endowed with. As
available information typically diﬀers across agents, diﬀerent beliefs on other agents’
actions emerge, which aﬀect equilibrium outcomes and welfare. A common assumption
is that information is freely available. In practice, however, the process of information
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1acquisition/provision is often far from costless, which constrains the precision of the
information acquired by private agents, or provided by a policy maker. Understanding
how costly information inﬂuences agents’ expectations and actions, and evaluating the
welfare and policy implications of public information provision versus private informa-
tion acquisition, are the main goals of this paper.
In a beauty contest framework, Morris and Shin (2002) have shown that an height-
ened precision of the information provided by a policy maker may have a detrimental
eﬀect on social welfare. Subsequent contributions have proved that Morris and Shin’s
results are not conclusive as to the social value of information. In particular, Angeletos
and Pavan (2007) have shown that the eﬀects of public information on welfare de-
pend crucially on the degree of strategic complementarity or substitutability of agents’
actions.
Following Angeletos and Pavan (2007), we allow for both strategic complementarity
and substitutability in actions. However, our setup diﬀers from their in two important
respects. First, we model explicitly both the acquisition of private information and the
provision of public information as being costly and endogenously determined. Second,
we model decision making in a sequential way: private agents choose the precision of
their private information only after the precision of the public signal has been set by
a policy maker. The latter acts as a von Stackelberg leader, who optimally exploits
the fact that an increase in the precision of the public signal reduces agents’ incentives
to acquire private information, thereby inducing socially valuable savings of private
resources.1
Focusing on symmetric linear equilibria, we show that the endogenous level of pre-
cision of public information increases in the degree of strategic complementarity among
agents’ actions. This is due to the fact that the more strategic complementarity there
is, the larger are the incentives for agents to align their actions, and thus the larger is
the weight assigned to the precision of public information. Exactly the opposite occurs
for the demand of private information precision, which is therefore decreasing in the
degree of strategic complementarity.
In a welfare perspective, allowing for information precision to be costly leads to
novel insights on the interplay between public and private signals. We show that,
when the costs of information precision are linear, only one type of information of
positive precision (either public or private) is provided to the market.2 In particular,
a welfarist policy maker chooses to provide public information (of optimal precision)
if the cost ratio of public to private information precision is below a threshold. We
ﬁnd that this threshold depends crucially on the degree of coordination among agents’
actions. Indeed, an increase in the equilibrium degree of agents’ actions coordination
has two countervailing eﬀects on information precision. On the one hand, it reduces
the value each individual attaches to the precision of her private signal. This, by
1The provision of public information is typically based on complex and standardized procedures of
data collection and processing performed by a statistics authority. As private agents are not bound
to follow the same procedures but can focus just on the piece of information they need, they can be
much faster in acquiring additional information. Therefore, it seems natural to assume that private
agents take as given the precision of the information provided by the statistics authority before deciding
whether to collect more precise information.
2The assumption of linear costs is a useful benchmark. In Appendix C we extend our analysis to
the case of convex cost functions, showing that our results are not speciﬁc to a linear cost setup.
2augmenting the relative value of public information, increases the cost threshold below
which only public information is provided. On the other hand, however, it may induce
individuals to ineﬃciently overweight public information (as it is typically the case in a
beauty contest), so that an increase in the equilibrium degree of coordination widens the
distance between ﬁrst best and equilibrium outcomes. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one even when the cost of public information precision
exceeds that of private information. This suggests that in the many instances in which
strategic complementarities matter (so that agents have an incentive to coordinate
their actions) a more precise public information is almost always welfare improving,
unless of course the cost of public information precision is much larger than that of
private information; a case in which the cost eﬀect dominates the more interesting
strategic eﬀect. In the presence of strategic complementarities, the stronger is the
coordination motive behind agents’ actions, the more an increase in the precision of
public information crowds-out private information.
These ﬁndings send a strong pro-transparency message to policy makers. The im-
plications of strategic complementarities for public information transparency become
evident when focusing on monopolistic competition monetary economies in which the
substitution elasticity between goods induces a ‘taste’ for coordination among agents.
In economies of this type, the dispersion in prices induces scattering in the production
levels of speciﬁc varieties; a phenomenon that reduces the marginal utility of aggregate
consumption and increases the marginal disutility of labor supply. Accordingly, the
optimal level of public information precision is typically positive and larger than that
of private information precision, even when public signals are much costlier than pri-
vate ones. This suggests that a policy maker – e.g., a Central Bank – should (almost)
always provide precise statistics for the key macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, in
the presence of strategic complementarity, the provision of a more precise public signal
tends to crowd out the acquisition of private information, since agents obtain better
information from a source they value more. Hence, if public signals are suﬃciently
precise (i.e., optimally provided from a welfare stand point), consumers/ﬁrms have no
incentives to acquire private information. Whenever this is the case, the business cycle
is unlikely to be ampliﬁed by the dispersion of private information. This leads to the
implication that the eﬀects of active monetary (and/or ﬁscal) policies are unlikely to
be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by information dispersion as far as the sources of the cycle lie
in aggregate shocks.
The strong pro-transparency message of the paper rests on the welfare implications
of the link between information provision and strategic complementarities. Quite ob-
viously, diﬀerent conclusions are reached when agents’ actions are strategic substitutes
rather than complements, as it is typically the case when negative externalities (such
as pollution or congestion) are at play. We show that in these circumstances agents
fail to fully internalize the eﬀects of the externalities, which induces them to choose
an excessively high level of actions’ alignment. Therefore, they tend to systematically
overweight the importance of public information in taking their decisions. Accordingly,
an increase in the precision of private information, by augmenting the dispersion in
agents’ actions, is welfare improving; an eﬀect that becomes stronger the larger is the
degree of strategic substitutability in equilibrium. Conversely, providing a more pre-
cise public information is detrimental for welfare since it leads agents to excessively
3coordinate their actions, worsening the misalignment of private and social costs.
Related literature
Our paper belongs to the literature investigating the welfare implications of infor-
mation provision. In a highly debated article, Morris and Shin (2002) have shown
that public information may have a detrimental eﬀect on welfare in a beauty contest
framework. In the presence of strategic complementarity in actions, agents exploit
public information to coordinate, relying on it to estimate a fundamental. However,
when actions complementarity is not warranted in a social welfare perspective, more
precise public information can be detrimental, as it ineﬃciently reduces agents’ reliance
on idiosyncratic signals. We show that this result is theoretically unwarranted when
information is costly. The low reliance on private signals typical of a beauty contest,
together with the assumption that information acquisition is costly, imply in fact that
agents have little incentives to acquire more precise private information. In this sce-
nario, an increase in the precision of the public signal turns out to be always beneﬁcial,
but for the cases in which the cost of public information greatly exceeds that of private
information.
Morris and Shin’s (2002) seminal paper has stimulated a series of contributions
on the channels through which information provision aﬀects welfare.3 Cornand and
Heinemann (2008), again in a beauty contest setup, focus on the diﬀusion of public
information, showing that social welfare rises whenever more precise public information
reaches a fraction only of market participants, so to weaken the coordination role of
public information. Morris and Shin (2007) consider an economy characterized by
a ‘semi-public’ signal reaching a fraction of agents, which adds to the usual public
information directed to all market participants. The authors ﬁnd that, whenever agents
have no taste for dispersion, the fragmentation of information leads necessarily to a
welfare loss. The welfare implications of both papers rest essentially on the fact that
some relevant information reaches a share only of market participants. In our setup,
the welfare eﬀects of information depend instead on the strategic interactions between
private and public signals that are available to all market participants.
In Morris and Shin (2005), public information is the result of a data collection
process that reﬂects private actions, depending in turn upon private information. A
higher precision of public information reduces the reliance of agents’ actions on private
information, so that future public signals are obtained by extracting information from
‘less informative’ actions. Hence, an increase in the precision of public information
decreases the current use of private information.4 In our paper, we focus on an en-
tirely diﬀerent setup in which the policy maker directly observes the aggregate shocks
hitting the economy and strategically exploits the implications on private information
acquisition of the public information she provides.
3There has been a debate also on the empirical plausibility of Morris and Shin’s (2002) result, which
has been questioned by Svensson (2006) and reaﬃrmed by Morris, Shin and Tong (2006).
4The information externality considered by Morris and Shin (2005) has been previously studied by,
e.g., Vives (1993), and Amato and Shin (2006). More recently, Amador and Weill (2009) have built on
an analogous learning externality that induces households to put less weight on their private forecasts
following a release of public information, which may reduce welfare by increasing agents’ uncertainty
about fundamentals.
4Hellwig (2005) and Roca (2006), among others, investigate the welfare implications
of information provision/acquisition in monetary economies with monopolistic compe-
tition ` a la Dixit and Stiglitz. The main claim of this literature is that disregarding some
private information can be socially valuable as ﬁrms partly neglect their contribution
to aggregate risk. In our setup, monopolistic competition – by implying strategic com-
plementarity of agents’ actions – reduces the reliance of price setters on their private
signals, which in turn is shown to increase the incentives of the policy maker to provide
more precise public information.
Lorenzoni (2010) focuses on a setup similar to that of Hellwig (2005) but for the
fact that agents face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and that monetary policy af-
fects the weight agents assign to the (exogenously given) precision of public information
in estimating productivity diﬀerentials. He shows that an increase in the precision of
public information has two opposite eﬀects on welfare. On the one hand, it reduces
welfare by increasing aggregate volatility; on the other hand, it increases welfare since it
helps producers to set relative prices reﬂecting more closely the underlying productivity
diﬀerentials across sectors. While for a given monetary policy rule the possibility of
welfare-decreasing public information depends on the balance between aggregate and
cross-sectional eﬀects, the latter always dominate the ﬁrst if monetary policy is set
optimally, so that more precise public information has unambiguously a positive eﬀect
on welfare. We obtain similar results focusing, however, on an entirely diﬀerent chan-
nel. In our setup, the eﬀects of public information on welfare hinge in fact upon the
substitutability of costly public and private information, which increases in the degree
of complementarity of agents’ actions.
The key role of strategic complementarities and substitutabilities in actions is inves-
tigated by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) in a framework that allows a complete welfare
analysis of the eﬀects of information provision/acquisition for a rich class of economies
with payoﬀ externalities and dispersed information. Looking at the same class of
economies, we allow for information precision to be costly and for a sequential tim-
ing in the information acquisition process. To the best of our knowledge, only a few
papers have focused on costly processes of signals acquisition. Among them, Hellwig
and Veldkamp (2009) investigate optimal individual information choices in a model
where agents acquire information within a collection of signals of given precision. They
show that strategic complementarities in actions induce coordination motives in private
information acquisition (i.e., “agents who want to do what others do, want to know
what others know”, Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009, p. 223), which may lead to multi-
ple equilibria.5 Similarly to us, Hellwig and Veldkamp explicitly consider the stage in
which agents can improve the quality of their information at a cost. Diﬀerently from us,
however, they do not focus on the choice of public information precision by the policy
maker, which we show to have a signiﬁcant impact on private information acquisition.
Myatt and Wallace (2010) consider endogenous information acquisition in a beauty
contest framework, allowing players to access a variety of information sources.6 The
5A similar point is made by Ma´ ckowiak and Wiederholt (2009) who, in a framework with rational
inattention, show that strategic complementarity in price setting leads to strategic complementarity in
the price setters’ allocation of attention.
6A similar problem is addressed by Myatt and Wallace (2008), who however do not focus explicitly
on the issue of information acquisition by agents.
5precision of each signal depends on how much attention an agent pays to the corre-
sponding information source. The greater care she exerts, the higher the cost she carries
and the larger the signal clarity she achieves. If agents pay careful attention to the same
sources of information, the correlation of their signals endogenously increases, which in
turn implies an increase in the degree of information publicity. Diﬀerently from Hell-
wig and Veldkamp (2009) who develop a framework in which agents choose whether to
observe or not a signal and multiple equilibria may arise, Myatt and Wallace (2010)
focus on a setup in which agents choose how carefully to consider diﬀerent information
sources, which turns out implying that the information equilibrium is unique. Diﬀer-
ently from us, by moving away from the public-private signal distinction, they do not
study the implications of information provision by a policy maker and the strategic
interplay between private and public sources of information.
Wong (2008) focuses on a more specialized framework addressing the role of trans-
parency of a monetary policy authority. The policy maker may costlessly provide a
signal of given precision to agents, who can additionally purchase at a given cost a
private signal of inﬁnite precision.7 The main diﬀerence between our setup and that
of Wong in terms of information provision is that Wong does not study the strategic
dimension of the choice of information precision by the policy maker, which rests at the
core of our contribution. Finally, Demerzis and Hoeberichts (2007) adapt Morris and
Shin (2002) framework to investigate costly information acquisition in a macroeconomic
setup in which agents receive a public signal from a monetary authority and need to
forecast inﬂation. Diﬀerently from us, in their model public information provision by
the policy maker (i.e., a central bank) and private information acquisition by agents
occur simultaneously, which again weakens the strategic implications of the problem
faced by the policy maker.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We setup our model and discuss its
timing in Section 2. In Section 3 we introduce the equilibrium concept and we investi-
gate the use of information in equilibrium, while in Section 4 we study the individual
problem of information acquisition. Section 5 presents our eﬃciency benchmark, and
Section 6 deals with the provision of public information by the policy maker. Section
7 applies our framework to economies characterized by the presence of beauty con-
tests, price setting complementarities, and negative production externalities. Section
8 concludes the paper. All proofs and technical details omitted in the main text are
contained in Appendix A. Appendix B fully details the price-setting complementarities
model presented in Section 7.2, and Appendix C extends the analysis of our applications
to the case in which the costs of information precisions are convex.
7In Wong’s model, agents play a beauty contest and are heterogeneous in their costs of information
acquisition, so that only those who face costs that are suﬃciently low invest in a signal about the
fundamental. An increase in the precision of the public signal reduces the share of agents that purchase
the information about the fundamental. This may lead to an increase of the dispersion in ﬁrms’ actions,
which could be detrimental for welfare.
62 The Setup
We study a two periods economy populated by a continuum of agents indexed by
the unit interval [0,1] and characterized by incomplete information. Each agent i
observes noisy private and public signals on an underlying fundamental θ. In period
−1, every agent knows the state of the economy θ−1, which represents the common ex
ante expectation on the state variable θ.8 The fundamental evolves according to the
stochastic process
θ = θ−1 + ϕ.
The shock ϕ, occurring at the beginning of period 0, is normally distributed with
mean zero, variance σ2
θ, and precision pθ ≡ σ−2
θ . After the realization of the shock,
every agent i receives a public signal, y, and a private signal, xi, such that
y = θ + ε,
xi = θ + ξi,
where ε is normally distributed, independent of θ, with mean zero and precision py,
and the noise terms ξi are normally distributed, independent of θ, ε, and ξj (j  = i),
with mean zero and precision pxi. While y is common knowledge to all agents, xi is
an idiosyncratic shock speciﬁc to agent i and not observable by the other agents. The
precision of the private signal may vary across agents.
The common posterior on θ given public information is normally distributed, with
mean E [θ|y] =
pθθ−1+pyy
pθ+py and precision p[θ|y] = pθ + py. To ease notation, we deﬁne




and precision p[θ|y,xi] = pz + pxi. Letting δi be the Bayesian






, we write the private posterior on θ as
E [θ|y,xi] = δiz + (1 − δi)xi.9









































k − C (pxi) − C (pz), (1)
where ki ∈ R denotes the action of agent i, K ≡
 
i kidi is the mean, and σ2
k ≡  
i [ki − K]
2 di is the dispersion of individual actions in the population. As it is standard,
we let dispersion having only a second-order non strategic external eﬀect by assuming
8This allows us to compute the same ex ante expected utilities for every agent, and hence to provide
a common evaluation for welfare.
9Our deﬁnition of information precision resembles that of ‘accuracy’ of agents’ forecasts introduced
by Angeletos and Pavan (2007).
7that Ukσ = UKσ = Uθσ = 0 and that Uσ (k,K,0,θ) = 0, for all (k,K,θ). Furthermore,
we impose symmetry on the second-order eﬀects of the fundamental and of agents’
actions on utility; i.e., Ukθ = Uθk, UKθ = UθK, UkK = UKk.
Our setup follows closely that of Angeletos and Pavan (2007), but for the fact that
we model information precision as being costly. More precisely, C (pxi) denotes the cost
suﬀered by agent i to improve the precision of her private signal, and C (pz) is the cost
to be suﬀered for improving the precision of the public signal. Throughout the paper,
we assume that the cost C (pz) is ﬁnanced by means of lump sum taxes Ti = T for all
i.
The quadratic speciﬁcation of the utility function allows us to ensure the linearity
of agents’ best responses, and of the structure of eﬃcient allocations. The following
assumptions on partial derivatives are needed to guarantee that the utility maximization
problem is well deﬁned and that the equilibrium is unique.
Assumption 2.1 (i) Ukk < 0, (ii) −1 < −UkK/Ukk < 1, (iii) Ukk+2UkK +UKK < 0,
(iv) Ukk + Uσσ < 0 and (v) Ukθ  = 0.
Assumption 2.2 C
′
(pxi) > 0 and C
′′
(pxi) ≥ 0; C
′
(pz) > 0 and C
′′
(pz) ≥ 0.
Condition (i) in Assumption 2.1 imposes concavity at the individual level, so that
best responses are well deﬁned, while Condition (ii) guarantees that the equilibrium is
unique. Conditions (iii) and (iv) ensure concavity at the aggregate level, and that the
ﬁrst-best allocation is unique and bounded. Finally, Condition (v) guarantees that the
fundamental θ aﬀects equilibrium behavior. Assumption 2.2 states that the marginal
costs of both private and public information precision are non-decreasing.
The timing of the model, illustrated in Figure 1, is as follows.
Period -1 Period 0




Private agents observe  y, xi
Private agents choose actions Policy maker chooses py
Figure 1: The timing of the model
In period −1, all agents observe the state of the economy (θ−1) and the benevolent
(utilitarian) social planner chooses the precision of next period public information by
maximizing welfare, deﬁned as the sum of individual utilities. Subsequently, private
agents decide how much to invest in the precision of their private signals. In period 0,
each agent receives her signals (public and private), and chooses an action that aﬀects
both her utility and that of all other individuals.
8We solve the model by backward induction: in period 0, given the precisions of
information signals, private agents choose their actions. In period −1, private agents
choose the precision of their information given that of the public signal, and the policy
maker chooses the precision of public information by fully taking into account its eﬀects
on private agents’ actions.
In the next two sections, we focus on the decisional problems of private agents,
studying the choice of individual actions for given information precisions at time 0 (in
Section 3), and that of private information precision (in Section 4) at time −1. In
Sections 5 and 6 we turn to the deﬁnition of eﬃcient allocations and to the related
choice of the precision of the public signal at time −1, respectively.
3 The equilibrium use of information
In period 0, for signal precisions that are given, each individual chooses her action ki











In the symmetric case in which all agents receive signals of the same precision (i.e.,
pxi = px, i ∈ [0,1]), we can apply the notion of linear equilibrium adopted by Morris
and Shin (2002), and Angeletos and Pavan (2007).
Deﬁnition 3.1 A linear equilibrium is a strategy k : R2 → R, linear in x and y, such
that for all (x,y),
















x k(x,y)dP (x | θ,y), P (x | θ,y) denotes the cumulative
distribution function of x conditional on θ and y, and σk (θ,y) ≡
  





x [k(x,y) − K (θ,y)]
2 dP (x | θ,y)
 1/2
for all (θ,y).
Following the same logic of Proposition 1 in Angeletos and Pavan (2007), we can
prove the following
Proposition 3.1
Let α ≡ −
UkK
Ukk , κ1 ≡ −
Ukθ
Ukk+UkK and κ0 ≡ −
Uk
Ukk+UkK.
(i) A strategy k (x,y) is a linear equilibrium if and only if, for all (x,y)
k(x,y) = E [(1 − α)κ0 + (1 − α)κ1θ + αK (θ,y) | x,y]. (3)
(ii) There exists a unique linear equilibrium, which is given by









9Observe that α denotes the slope of every agent’s best response to aggregate ac-
tivity, which represents the equilibrium degree of coordination of agents’ actions, with
α ∈ (−1,1) by Assumption 2.1. Note also that δ captures the relative precision of
public information, and it is therefore the correlation across agents’ forecasting errors
on θ, which is labeled by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) as the ‘commonality’ of infor-
mation. It is evident from (4) that the sensitivity of the equilibrium to the two types
of information (i.e., γ) depends both on the commonality of information and on the
degree of coordination α. As pointed out by Angeletos and Pavan (2007), it can easily
be seen that when α  = 0 the equilibrium action is biased toward either private or public
information depending on the degree of strategic substitutability or complementarity
in agents’ actions. More precisely, when agents’ actions are strategic complements (i.e.,
α > 0), the equilibrium is more sensitive to public information as γ > δ; instead, when
actions are strategic substitutes (i.e., α < 0), the equilibrium strategy is tilted towards
private information as γ < δ.10
As we investigate the problem of agents’ information acquisition, we need to de-
termine the impact of individual information precision on agents’ actions and thus on
their expected utility. In order to do so, we assume that all agents other than j – for
given and identical information precisions – play according to their (linear) equilibrium
strategy
k(x,y) = κ0 + κ1(γz + (1 − γ)x), (5)
where γ is determined in the unique linear equilibrium of Proposition 3.1 by taking
into account that the deviating agent j has zero measure. The following proposition
characterizes the best response of agent j deviating from the equilibrium strategy played
by all other agents i  = j.
Proposition 3.2 A strategy kj (xj,y) is the best response to the unique linear equilib-
rium strategy k (x,y) played by all agents i  = j if and only if
kj (xj,y) = κ0 + κ1 (γjz + (1 − γj)xj), (6)
where
γj =
(1 − α)δj + αδ






Note that γj = γ if δj = δ (or, equivalently, if pxj = px), and that γj < γ if δj < δ.
Therefore, an increase in the precision of agent j’s private signal (i.e., a reduction of
δj) implies a smaller weight on the public signal. Furthermore, an increase in the
equilibrium degree of coordination α reduces the impact of δj on γj since the larger is
the degree of coordination between agents’ actions the smaller is the marginal eﬀect on
actions of the precision of public information.
10It is also immediate to see that, when α = 0, the weights on x and y are the Bayesian weights; i.e.,
γ = δ.
104 The acquisition of private information
Given the equilibrium strategy (6), the ex-ante (period −1) expected utility of agent






















































where ˜ κ collects all the terms that are independent of information precisions pxj, px,
pz, and Tj denotes the fraction of the cost of public information precision borne by
agent j.
Notice that ex-ante utility is inﬂuenced by the precision of both public and private
information. Agent j chooses the precision of her private information by maximizing
(8). In order to keep the problem analytically tractable, we assume that the cost of
private information is linear.11
Assumption 4.1 C (pxi) = cpr   pxi, with cpr > 0, ∀i.
The eﬀects of the precision of public and private information on agent j’s ex-ante
utility are illustrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1
(i) A marginal increase in the weight γj of the precision of public information has
no eﬀects on ex-ante individual expected utility.
(ii) The precision of private information that maximizes ex-ante individual expected







(px + pz)(1 − α)














(pz+(1−α)px)2 if pxj ≥ 0
0 otherwise
.
11This is consistent with the view of, e.g., Myatt and Wallace (2010). Focusing as an illustrative
example on a market research framework, they note that any survey by which a supplier aims at
investigating demand conditions is subject to a sampling error. The precision of the information
acquired through a survey is directly proportional to the sample size; i.e., to the number of individuals
interviewed. Assuming that there is a ﬁx price-per-interview, it is natural to assume that the cost of
information acquisition is linear.
11Therefore, when there is strategic complementarity among agents’ actions (i.e., α ∈
(0,1)), an increase in the precision of other agents’ private information raises the pre-
cision of agent j’s information as well. The opposite occurs in the case of strategic
substitutability (i.e., α ∈ (−1,0)). These results are fully consistent with those of
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) who note that, when actions are complements, informa-
tion acquisition is complementary, while when actions are substitutes, agents want to
know what others do not. To better understand the intuition of the ﬁndings above,
observe that an increase in the precision of agents’ private information implies that
their signals become more concentrated. Hence, with strategic complementarity, agent
j has an incentive to increase the precision of her signal, so to better align it with
the private information available to other agents. Conversely, in the case of strategic
substitutability, agent j aims at reducing the degree of alignment between her private
signal and those of other agents. Thus, she has an incentive to reduce the precision of
her information.














It is easy to see that px is decreasing in its cost (cpr) as well as in the precision
of the public signal (pz), and increasing in the eﬀect of information precision on the
individually perceived marginal utility of actions (Ukk) weighed by the agent’s reaction
to changes in the fundamental (κ2
1). Perhaps less obviously, px is decreasing in the
degree of strategic complementarity of agents’ actions (α). This follows from the fact
that a higher degree of strategic complementarity increases agents’ incentives to align
their actions, and hence it reduces the value they attach to the precision of their
idiosyncratic information for any cpr > 0. Analogous observations apply to the case of
strategic substitutability.
Equation (10) highlights also the negative relationship between the precisions of
private and public information, indicating the existence of substitutability between
the two types of information. The extent of this substitutability depends crucially on
the degree of strategic complementarity/substitutability among agents’ actions. In the
presence of strategic complementarity (α > 0), an increase of α enhances the substi-
tutability between public information and private information precisions. The higher is
the equilibrium degree of coordination among agents’ actions, the larger is the weight
γ assigned to public information in choosing actions (see Equation (4)) and the smaller
is that assigned to private information precision.12 Accordingly, public information
carries more weight than private information, which increases its eﬀectiveness in sub-
stituting for private signals. Conversely, in the presence of strategic substitutability
that reduces agents’ incentives to align actions, the negative relationship between the
precision of public information and that of private information is weakened.
12Also Myatt and Wallace (2010) ﬁnd that an increase in strategic complementarity reduces the
precision of the private signals acquired by agents.
125 The eﬃciency benchmark
After having characterized the actions of private agents and their choices of private
signals precisions, we turn to the characterization of the precision of the public signal.
In order to understand the welfare implications of information volatility, and those of
dispersion arising from strategic eﬀects, we need ﬁrst to establish an eﬃciency bench-
mark.






















dP (x | θ,y). (11)

























+WKθKθ + Uθθθ2 −
 
i
[C (pxi) + Ti]di,
where WK ≡ Uk + UK, WKK ≡ Ukk + 2UkK + UKK, WKθ ≡ Ukθ + UKθ, and Wσσ ≡
Ukk +Uσσ. Note that (12) can also be interpreted as the complete information welfare,
under the constraint that the dispersion of agents’ actions is σ2
k. Assumption 2.1, by
requiring that WKK < 0 and Wσσ < 0, guarantees that welfare is ﬁnite.13
The following lemma characterizes the ﬁrst best allocation for an economy in which
the fundamental θ is common knowledge.
Lemma 5.1 The unique eﬃcient allocation under complete information is given by




0 ≡ − WK
WKK, and κ∗
1 ≡ − WKθ
WKK.
It is straightforward to observe that κ∗
1 captures the impact of the fundamental on
the ﬁrst-best allocation.
We now need to determine the (second best) eﬃcient allocations in a framework
where the fundamental θ is not common knowledge (i.e., at the beginning of period
0). In order to do so, we deﬁne an eﬃcient allocation as a strategy that maximizes
ex ante utility under the constraint that information can not be transferred among
agents. As noted by Angeletos and Pavan (2007), this amounts to identify “the best
a society could do if its agents were to internalize their payoﬀ interdependencies and
appropriately adjust their use of available information without communicating with
one another” (p. 1114). Formally:
13It is immediate to note that if Assumption 2.1 were not satisﬁed, inﬁnite welfare could be achieved
by reducing the precision of information at time −1. Such a decrease in precision would enlarge the
dispersion of agents’ actions in period 0 (see Equation 3) raising welfare.
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[k (x,y) − K (x,y)]
2 dP (x | θ,y).
The following proposition (equivalent to Proposition 2 in Angeletos and Pavan,
2007) characterizes the eﬃcient allocation that solves the problem stated in Deﬁnition
5.1.
Proposition 5.1
(i) An allocation k : R2 → R is eﬃcient under incomplete information if and only
if, for almost all (x,y)
k(x,y) = E [(1 − α∗)κ∗ (θ) + α∗K (θ,y)|x,y], (14)
where




(ii) There exists a unique eﬃcient allocation for almost all (x,y), which is given by
k∗ (x,y) = κ∗
0 + κ∗




1 − α∗ (1 − δ)
. (17)
It is easy to see that Condition (14) is the analogue for eﬃciency of the best re-
sponse function (3) in the characterization of the complete information equilibrium,
once substituting κ0, κ1 and α with κ∗
0, κ∗
1 and α∗, respectively. Therefore, α∗ can
be interpreted as the optimal degree of coordination, in that it is the level of com-
plementarity (α∗ > 0) or substitutability (α∗ < 0) that a planner would like agents
to perceive in order for the equilibrium of the economy to coincide with the eﬃcient
allocation. Equation (15) shows that α∗ is decreasing with social aversion to volatility
(−WKK) and increasing with social aversion to dispersion (−Wσσ). Moreover, since
Wσσ ≡ Ukk+Uσσ, an increase of Uσσ reduces the social aversion to dispersion, implying
a smaller α∗. Observe ﬁnally that γ∗ indicates the relative sensitivity of the eﬃcient
allocation to public and private information, just as γ does for the equilibrium allo-
cation. By comparing γ and γ∗, it is therefore possible to see that the sensitivity of
the equilibrium allocation to public noise is ineﬃciently large whenever the equilibrium
degree of coordination is higher than the optimal one; i.e., γ ≥ γ∗ ⇐⇒ α ≥ α∗.
146 The provision of public information
In period −1 the policy maker chooses optimally the precision of public information
py (and hence pz) by taking into account agents’ best responses to the choice of public
information precision, both in terms of their signals precisions and of their actions (see
Equations (10) and (5), respectively).
Consistently with the welfare criterion discussed in Section 5, we focus on a welfarist
policy maker that chooses the precision of the public signal by maximizing the expected
value of the integral sum over agents of individual utility functions, evaluated at the
symmetric equilibrium in which γi = γ, for all i; i.e.,























In Appendix A it is shown that the welfare criterion (18) can be restated as


























C (pxi)di − C (pz),











collects all the terms that are independent of public
and private signals precisions, and C (pz) denotes the cost of increasing the precision
of public information, with C (pz) =
 
i Tidi.14 As for private information precision,
we assume that the cost faced by the policy maker to increase the precision of public
information is linear. More precisely:
Assumption 6.1 C (py) = cpb   py, cpb > 0.
Note that, since pz ≡ pθ + py, and pθ is a structural characteristic of the evolution
of the fundamental, the cost of public information provision is completely deﬁned by
the cost of a more precise public signal y.
In the following, we also assume that












2. To better understand the implications of the assumption, focus on the special
case in which px = 0 (and thus γ = 1), so that Equation (19) reduces to













Equation (20) makes it evident that Assumption 6.2 provides a suﬃcient condition
guaranteeing that the marginal utility of public information precision is positive at
least when the precision of private information is zero.
14Recall that the cost of public information provision is ﬁnanced by means of a lump sum tax Ti.
15Focusing on Equation (19), we highlight several eﬀects of the precision of public
information on welfare. An increase of pz given γ exerts a twofold direct eﬀect on














that when pz increases, each agent becomes better able to align her individual strategy
k(x,y) to the one that she would choose under perfect information (i.e., to κ0 + κ1θ).
This implies a reduction in the ex-ante variance of each individual’s action, which
improves welfare since the agent’s objective function is concave. This ﬁrst eﬀect is
captured by term WKKκ2
1
γ2
2pz, which is increasing in pz since WKK < 0 by Assumption
2.1. Second, recall that individual strategies are selected via a maximization procedure
that disregards the contribution of each individual to the aggregate action K, so that
each individual strategy (3) diﬀers from the eﬃcient allocation (16). Whenever κ∗
1 > κ1,
it would be optimal for private agents to agree on a strategy proﬁle involving a stronger
reaction to the fundamental, and therefore to the public signal. Nonetheless, the fact
that a weaker response to (the expected realization of) the fundamental is implemented
has a positive second-order eﬀect on welfare, as it induces a lower variance of each







An increase of pz determines also an increase in the weight of the public signal γ,
which exerts three additional indirect eﬀects on welfare. The ﬁrst two are the exact
counterparts of the eﬀects of an increase in pz discussed above, and they are again
captured by the second addendum on the right hand side of Equation (19). The third
eﬀect is instead captured by the third addendum on the right hand side of Equation
(19), which summarizes the implications of the reduction in the weight (1 − γ) assigned
by each agent to her private signal. Such a reduction has an overall positive eﬀect on
welfare since Wσσ = Ukk +Uσσ < 0. Note in fact that, although the eﬀect of increasing
γ on the dispersion of agents’ actions (captured by Uσσ) is undetermined, its direct
eﬀect on welfare is certainly positive (since Ukk < 0) and suﬃcient to increase welfare
overall.
In what follows, it is useful to state Equation (19) as















((1 − α)Wσσ − WKK)
2
(1 − α)px
(pz + (1 − α)px)
2 +
−cprpx − cpbpy, (21)




px(1−α)+pz. By using the deﬁnition in Assumption 6.2 and by recalling that
α∗ ≡ 1− WKK
Wσσ (see Equation (15)), Equation (21) can be rewritten in a more compact
way as
W (px,pθ,py,θ−1) = ˜ W + κ2
1W′ 1








(pz + (1 − α)px)
2 − cprpx − cpbpy.
Note that the term (α∗ − α) in the equation captures the relationship between the
ﬁrst best and the market equilibrium degrees of coordination between agents’ actions.
16When the equilibrium degree of coordination falls short of the optimal one, an increase
in the precision of the public signal – by increasing the weight associated to public
information – raises welfare (gross of the eﬀect of the cost of information precision).
This follows from the fact that a more precise public information favors the alignment
of agents’ actions.15
In the following, we assume that











Assumption 6.3 guarantees that there are incentives to provide public information
of positive precision when no private information is acquired (see Equation 20), as well
as to acquire private information of positive precision when no public information is
provided (see Equation 10).16 It is worth noting that both the upper-bound levels ¯ cpb
and ¯ cpr are decreasing in pθ since additional information becomes less valuable when
the ex–ante information θ−1 already provides a good estimate of the fundamental.
Furthermore, both ¯ cpb and ¯ cpr are increasing in κ2
1 because actions respond more to
both public and private signals when κ2
1 is large, so that the precision of information
becomes more valuable. Moreover, ¯ cpb and ¯ cpr are increasing in the absolute value of
W′ and Ukk, respectively. This follows from the fact that the larger are W′ and Ukk
(in absolute value) the higher is the impact of the precision of information on utility.
Finally, ¯ cpr is decreasing in α. An increase in the degree of coordination reduces
the weight that agents assign to private information when selecting their equilibrium
actions, which in turn reduces the maximum cost they are willing to pay in order to
acquire additional information.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal choice of the precision of infor-
mation by the policy maker, who (given the von Stackelberg structure of the informa-
tion acquisition game) takes into account the optimal choices of private information
precisions by agents for any given level of public information precision.
Proposition 6.1
























(pz + (1 − α)px)
2
with respect to pz, it is immediate see that there is a positive contribution of the precision of public
information to welfare whenever α
∗ > α.
16Assumption 6.3 allows us to disregard some uninteresting cases, simplifying the technicalities with-
out loss of generality. It is in fact intuitive that when the cost of public information precision exceeds
¯ cpb, only private information is acquired. Similarly, when the cost of private information becomes larger
than ¯ cpr, agents have no incentives to acquire private information.
17Case 1. c′ > c′′.
There exists a threshold ˜ c(cpb), with c′′ < ˜ c(cpb) < c′, such that the optimal choices







cpb − pθ, and p∗
x = 0 for
cpb
cpr < ˜ c(cpb);
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cpr ≥ ˜ c(cpb).
Case 2. c′ ≤ c′′.
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To understand the intuition of the proposition, focus on the meaning and determi-
nants of the relative cost thresholds c′′ and c′. The threshold c′′ determines whether











otherwise. It is easy to see that
c′′ is increasing in the spread between the socially optimal and the equilibrium degree
of coordination (i.e., α∗ − α). Note in fact that when α∗ − α > 0, a greater degree of
coordination is desirable. Therefore, as an increase in the precision of the public signal
improves the alignment of agents’ actions, the relative cost threshold above which no
private information is provided increases. Additionally, the equilibrium degree of coor-
dination α exerts two direct eﬀects on the threshold c′′. First, focus on the term 1
1−α in
the expression of c′′. By reducing the weight of private information in the estimation
of the fundamental due to the coordination motive in agents’ actions, an increase in
α diminishes more than proportionally agents’ incentives to acquire private informa-
tion (see Equations 4 and 10). This determines socially valuable savings of resources,
inducing the policy maker to provide more precise public information for higher costs




in the expression of c′′. For a given α∗ − α > 0, an increase in α induces a closer
alignment of agents’ actions, which raises the value of a more precise public signal –
hence increasing the threshold c′′.17 Observe ﬁnally that, in the opposite case in which
α∗ − α < 0, it would be optimal to reduce the alignment of agents’ actions, which
creates a tension between the saving eﬀect and that of actions alignment. The overall
impact of α on c′′ depends then on which of the two eﬀects prevails.
As for c′, it deﬁnes the relative cost threshold below which the policy maker ﬁnds
it optimal to supply a public signal having a precision larger than that oﬀsetting the
acquisition of private information (see the proof of Proposition 6.1 in Appendix A).
This occurs when the relative cost of public to private information is lower than the
marginal welfare eﬀect of an increase in the precision of public information, for any
given level of private information precision. It is easy to see from the deﬁnition of c′ in
17Recall that the improved alignment of agents’ actions is beneﬁcial since α
∗ −α > 0, and
Wσσ
Ukk > 0.
18Proposition 6.1 that c′ is increasing in the equilibrium degree of coordination of agents’
actions. This follows again from the fact that a more precise public signal, by fostering
actions alignment, raises welfare.
Having clariﬁed the meaning of the thresholds c′′ and c′, Case 2 in Proposition
6.1 is easily understood. As for Case 1, given that c′ > c′′, it is apparent from the
discussion above that for c′′ < cpb/cpr < c′ the policy maker can either provide all the
needed information precision through a public signal, or allow private agents to acquire
it by means of a private signal. Therefore, the decision problem of the policy maker
becomes whether to provide a public signal entirely oﬀsetting the acquisition of private
information, or to let private agents acquiring information on their own. The threshold
˜ c(cpb) discriminates between these two cases.
7 Applications
In this section, we specialize the setup introduced in the previous sections to study the
implications of strategic complementarities or substitutabilities for the provision/acqui-
sition of information in general equilibrium frameworks that allow for meaningful wel-
fare comparisons. In particular, we investigate the eﬀects of information provision on
welfare in beauty contests, the implications of price setting complementarities for trans-
parency, and the impact of negative externalities entailing strategic substitutability on
information acquisition.
Recall that in our setup, due to the assumption of linear costs of information pre-
cision, only one type of information of positive precision exists in equilibrium. In
Appendix C, we extend our analysis to the case in which the costs of public and pri-
vate information are convex so that public and private information of positive precision
typically coexist.
7.1 ‘Beauty Contests’
Morris and Shin (2002) have shown that public information may have a detrimental
eﬀect on welfare in beauty contest frameworks. Their result builds on the twofold role
of public information that, on the one hand, provides information on the fundamental
and, on the other hand, serves as a focal point for agents’ beliefs. As it is now well
understood, the detrimental eﬀect of public information arises from a coordination
motive inducing agents to place a weight on the public signal that is larger than the
socially optimal one.






= −(1 − r)(ki − θ)
2 − r
 
Li − ¯ L
 
, (23)
where ki ∈ R denotes agent i’s action, θ represents the state of the economy, and
r ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, Li =
  1
0 [kh − ki]
2 dh = (ki − K)
2 + σ2
k, where K denotes the
mean of agents’ actions, and ¯ L =
  1
0 Lidi = 2σ2
k. The ﬁrst term in (23) captures the
value for an agent of aligning her action to the fundamental θ, Li is the ‘beauty contest’
term representing the private value of taking an action close to those of other agents,
and ¯ L is an externality ensuring that there is no social value in reducing Li.







= −(1 − r)(ki − θ)
2 − r(ki − K)
2 + rσ2
k − cprpx − cpbpy. (24)
Morris and Shin’s setup can easily be embedded into the framework of the present
paper. In particular, it is immediate to note that Ukk = −2, UkK = 2r, UKK = −2r,
Ukθ = 2(1 − r), UKθ = 0, Uσσ = 2r, and that α = r, α∗ = 0, and κ1 = κ∗
1 = 1.
Accordingly, in a social perspective, the private incentives to coordinate are excessively
large since α > α∗. Note also that the term ¯ L introduces a taste for dispersion (i.e.,
Uσσ > 0) into the model. Observe ﬁnally that WKK = Wσσ = 2(r − 1) < 0, and
W′ = WKK/2 < 0, so that Assumptions 2.1 and 6.2 hold.
The thresholds c′′ and c′ of Proposition 6.1 become c′′ = 1, and c′ = 1
1−r > c′′.
Therefore, when cpb/cpr < ˜ c(cpb) with c′′ < ˜ c(cpb) < c′, agents do not acquire pri-
vate information and the best policy of the policy maker is to increase the precision of
public information until the marginal utility of the latter equalizes its marginal cost.18
Conversely, when cpb/cpr ≥ ˜ c(cpb) and Assumption 6.3 holds, the cost of private infor-
mation precision is so high that the only welfare maximizing policy is to provide the
public signal alone.
Figure 2 highlights the shapes of the threshold ˜ c(cpb) for diﬀerent values of α.19


















Figure 2: Behaviors of ˜ c(cpb) in Morris and Shin’s beauty contest for diﬀerent values
of α.
The continuous line in Figure 2 is drawn for α = 0.5, which corresponds in Morris
and Shin’s (2002) framework to the smallest value of the degree of coordination allow-
ing for a negative welfare eﬀect of an increase in public information precision. It is
18Consistently with Colombo and Femminis (2008), whenever cpb = cpr, only public information of
positive precision is provided.
19In this ﬁgure (as well as in Figures 3 and 4) the value of cpr is deﬁned as a share of ¯ cpr, and the
domain of cpb is determined consistently.
20immediate to see from the ﬁgure that, even in this limiting case, only public informa-
tion is provided whenever cpb/cpr ≤ ˜ c(cpb), despite the fact that the marginal cost of
the public signal is larger than that of private information.
To better understand the intuition behind the interesting case in which cpb/cpr ≤
˜ c(cpb), recall that the analysis we developed in the previous sections suggests that there
are two countervailing forces aﬀecting the provision of public and private information.
First, the stronger is the coordination motive the less worthwhile is the acquisition
of private information. In fact, the higher is α, the lower is the weight assigned to
the private signal in the assessment of the fundamental. Accordingly, an increase
of py determines a larger reduction in the demand of private information precision
the higher is α (Equation 10), inducing a saving eﬀect. However, there is a second
eﬀect going in the opposite direction, as the excessive incentive to coordinate that
characterizes a beauty contest setup implies that the public signal is overweighted.
Therefore, an increase in the precision of public information induces each agent to
give more prominence to a signal the weight of which is already disproportionately
large. This overweighting eﬀect has a negative impact on welfare that contrasts with
the positive eﬀect of the savings in private information acquisition. Figure 2 shows
that in Morris and Shin’s (2002) beauty contest the saving eﬀect is stronger than the
overweighting eﬀect (inducing agents not to acquire private information at all) also
when the ratio of public to private information cost is larger than one. Interestingly,
the comparison of the three lines in Figure 2 shows that an increase in α makes the
cost saving eﬀect stronger than the overweighting one.
Altogether these results strongly support the pro-transparency view that improving
the accuracy of the signals provided by policy makers is beneﬁcial, despite the negative
eﬀects of the beauty contest term and even when the cost of public information precision
exceeds that of private information acquisition.
7.2 Price setting complementarity and transparency
A recent literature investigates the welfare implications of information provision in
monetary economies (see, e.g., Hellwig, 2005; Roca, 2006; Adam, 2007; Lorenzoni,
2010). We address this issue in the framework of a simple consumer-producer economy,
in which a continuum of agents i ∈ [0,1] derives utility J (Ci) from the consumption
of a composite good Ci – obtained via the usual Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.20 The con-
sumption choices of agent i depend on the price of the product she produces ki, on the
aggregate price level K and on the price dispersion σ2
k. Each individual i provides labor
services that are used in the production of a ﬁnal good Yi, of which she is the unique
producer. The disutility of labor (and hence labor supply) V (Yi) is aﬀected by a shock
θ. Our setup is close to those of Hellwig (2005) and Adam (2007), but for the fact that
we assume that each consumer i is the sole producer of good i. This latter assumption
aligns individual utilities and social welfare (deﬁned as in Section 5). The inﬂuence of
monetary policy on output is summarized by the quantity equation KY = ¯ M, which
can also be interpreted as a simple nominal GDP targeting.21
20A description and characterization of the economy is given in Appendix B.
21Y indicates the aggregate production level, and ¯ M denotes a ﬁxed stock of nominal money. Al-
though ¯ M is taken as exogenously given, it would be possible to incorporate in the quantity equation
21The resulting utility function of each consumer-producer – net of costs of informa-
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− cprpx − cpbpy.
(25)
¯ U (ki,K,θ) collects all the terms that are constant or linear in θ, K and ki, ¯ Y denotes
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  > 0
captures both the curvature of the marginal utility of consumption, and the sensitivity
of producers’ prices to the output gap. v > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
goods characterizing the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Note that, as it is standard in the
literature focusing on aggregate shocks (see, e.g., Hellwig, 2005; Roca, 2006), the vari-
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Moreover, it is Uσσ = −Ψ(¯ Y )v2, which highlights the presence of a distaste for dis-
persion. It is also immediate to verify that pricing decisions are complementary, since
α = v−1
v > 0. Furthermore, it is α∗ =
v2(1+ω)−ω
v2(1+ω) > α, indicating that the optimal
degree of coordination is higher than the privately perceived one. The privately per-
ceived degree of coordination falls short of the optimal one for two reasons. First, each
price setter i disregards the contribution to σ2
k of the dis-alignment in her individual
price ki from the average; second, each producer does not consider the positive eﬀect
of an increase in her speciﬁc price on the average price, and therefore on other agents’





. Hence, under perfect informa-
tion the price setters’ reaction to the fundamental is aligned with the socially optimal
one. Since WKK = −Ψ
 ¯ Y
 
ω, W′ = −Ψ
 ¯ Y
 
ω/2, and Wσσ = −Ψ
 ¯ Y
 
v2 (1 + ω) < 0,
Assumptions 2.1 and 6.2 hold whenever v > 1 and ω > 0.
Observe that, since α = v−1
v , the strategic complementarity in agents’ actions (e.g.,
price setting) depends on the elasticity parameter v.24 Because the demand function of
nominal velocity or money shocks (as in Hellwig, 2005).
22The non stochastic equilibrium is deﬁned by assuming that the variance of the labor supply shock
θ is equal to 0; i.e. σ
2
θ.
23Hellwig (2005) assumes that agents are uncertain about monetary policy shocks but do not face
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Hence, an increase in information transparency reduces price disper-
sion. Conversely, Lorenzoni (2010) focuses on disaggregated shocks. In his setup, a more precise public
information increases price dispersion, which raises welfare since an increase in public information helps
setting relative prices more aligned to productivity diﬀerentials.
24In Roca (2006), the degree of complementarity in prices is aﬀected both by v and by ω. Conversely,
in Adam (2007) and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2007), v does not play any role in, as in these papers
individual prices are directly proportional to the aggregate price level.
22the good produced by the generic agent i is negatively sloped, it emerges immediately
that an increase in the price level (K) raises the demand of the product supplied by
agent i, which in turn induces her to increase her own price ki.
Given the assumption of linear private and public costs of information precisions,
the thresholds in Proposition 6.1 become c′′ =
v(1+2ω)−ω
ω > 1, and c′ = 1 < c′′. It is
interesting to note that, due to the complementarity in pricing, the private perception
of the coordination motive falls short of the socially optimal one, which causes the
threshold c′′ to be always larger than one since v > 1.
The threshold c′′ discriminating between private and public information (see Propo-
sition 6.1, case 2) is illustrated in Figure 3 for diﬀerent values of α.25
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Figure 3: The cost threshold c′′ with price complementarities for diﬀerent values of α
Note that, even when α = 0.5 (corresponding to a cross-elasticity parameter of 2),
the acquisition of private information is dominated by the provision of public informa-
tion for a very large range of parameters values. As it is to be expected, this eﬀect
becomes stronger for larger values of v and therefore of α. This is due to the fact that,
in addition to the cost saving eﬀect already discussed for the beauty contest, the opti-
mal degree of coordination of agents’ actions (α∗) is always larger than the equilibrium
one (α), meaning that in equilibrium agents systematically underweight the importance
of the public signal with respect to what it would be optimal. This implies that an
increase in the precision of public information, by augmenting the weight agents assign
to it, favors the alignment of their actions, which is welfare improving unless the cost
of public information precision is far larger than that of private information.26
These results suggest that business cycles are unlikely to be driven by the dispersion
of information across agents. When the economy is hit by an aggregate shock, the
25Our numerical exercises are based on the normalization ¯ θ = 1 and on the assumption that ω = 4,
which is plausible given that ω reﬂects both the curvature of the marginal utility of consumption and
the elasticity of the real cost with respect to output.
26Note that the emphasis on public information with respect to private information is consistent with
the empirical ﬁndings reported, e.g., by Romer and Romer (2000).
23possibility of agents’ acquiring private information does not have a signiﬁcant impact
on the eﬀects of monetary policy on the cycle. This ﬁnding follows from the fact that
the dispersion of private information across agents is oﬀset by an optimal provision
of public information. In a recent paper, Angeletos and La’O (2010) show that the
persistence of the business cycle stems both from the eﬀects of idiosyncratic shocks and
from the dispersion of agents’ information. We argue that the latter eﬀect is unlikely
to be the dominant one.
7.3 Negative production externalities
We consider a simple consumer-producer competitive economy, populated by a contin-
uum of identical agents. Each agent produces ki units of a non-diﬀerentiated private
good using labor as the only input. She derives the utility θJ (ki) from consuming the
good, where θ denotes an aggregate shock. Her utility function can be written as
U (ki,K,θ) = θJ (ki) − V (ki,K). (26)
Note that aggregate production K determines negative externalities, such as those due
to pollution or congestion.27 Labor disutility and the negative production externality
are embedded in the term V (ki,K) of the individual utility function (26). By tak-
ing into account also the cost of information precision, the objective function of the
consumer-producer can therefore be written as
U (ki,K,θ) = θJ (ki) − V (ki,K) − cprpx − cpbpy. (27)
The privately perceived marginal utility of the ﬁnal good is assumed being positive and
decreasing; i.e., Jk (ki) > 0, Jkk (ki) < 0. Furthermore, both the marginal disutility of
producing the ﬁnal good, Vk (ki,K), and the marginal impact on utility of the negative
externality associated to aggregate production, VK (ki,K), are assumed being positive
and increasing; i.e., Vk (ki,K) > 0, VK (ki,K) > 0, Vkk (ki,K) > 0, VKK (ki,K) > 0.
Finally, it is natural to assume that the marginal disutility of production increases with
the negative externality, which implies VkK (ki,K) > 0.
By taking a quadratic expansion of Equation (27), we can conveniently write
U (ki,K,θ) = ¯ U (ki,K,θ) + Jk









  ¯ K
 
− Vkk
  ¯ K, ¯ K
  
− VkK





  ¯ K, ¯ K
 
2
K2 − cprpx − cpbpy,
where ¯ K denotes the non stochastic equilibrium level of aggregate production, and ¯ θ
the expected value of the utility shock θ (i.e., θ−1).
Note that ¯ U (ki,K,θ) collects all the terms that are constant or linear in θ, K,
and kj.28 We deﬁne ω ≡ −(¯ θJkk( ¯ K)−Vkk( ¯ K, ¯ K)) ¯ K
¯ θJk( ¯ K) > 0 as the sum of consumption and
27Classical examples are Tybout (1972) and Rothemberg (1970). Models having the same qualitative
features can be obtained in entirely diﬀerent frameworks, such as those related to the exploitation of
natural resources (as in Scott Gordon, 1954, and Baumol and Oates, 1988), or to the private provision
of public goods (as in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986).
28Recall that ¯ k = ¯ K follows since agents have unit mass, and by symmetry.
24production elasticities, and we let χ ≡ VKK
  ¯ K, ¯ K
 
/VkK




U (ki,K,θ) = ¯ U (ki,K,θ) −
 ¯ θJkk
  ¯ K
 
− Vkk




















− cprpx − cpbpy. (29)
By letting ¯ θ = 1 without loss of generality, it is immediate to see that Ukk =
Jkk
  ¯ K
 
− Vkk
  ¯ K, ¯ K
 
, UkK = −VkK
  ¯ K, ¯ K
 
, UKK = χUkK, Ukθ = −
Jkk( ¯ K)−Vkk( ¯ K, ¯ K)
ω ,
UKθ = Uθθ = 0. Since Uσσ = 0, there is neither a taste nor a distaste for dispersion.
It is important to stress that production decisions are strategic substitutes since α =
VkK( ¯ K, ¯ K)
Jkk( ¯ K)−Vkk( ¯ K, ¯ K) < 0. By exploiting the deﬁnition of α, we obtain that κ1 = 1
ω(1−α).
Moreover, it is WKK = (1 − (2 + χ)α)Ukk, so that the optimal response to a change
in the fundamental is κ∗
1 = 1
ω(1−α(2+χ)).29 Notice also that our assumptions concerning
the utility function guarantee that κ1 > κ∗
1 > 0. Since Wσσ = Ukk and α∗ = 1 −
WKK
Wσσ ,
it is α∗ = (χ + 2)α < α. Therefore, the optimal degree of coordination falls short of the
privately perceived one. This follows directly from the fact that individual producers
ignore their contribution to the aggregate externality. Finally, since W′ =
1+αχ
2 Ukk,
Assumption 6.2 holds if and only if αχ > −1.
With the linear private and public costs of information precisions given in Assump-
tions 4.1 and 6.1, respectively, the thresholds in Proposition 6.1 become




Observe that in the presence of strategic substitutability the relevant cost thresholds
are smaller than one.30 This implies that the scope for public information provision is
reduced since – if cpb/cpr > c′ – there is no need to provide a more precise public signal
even when private information is more costly than public information. To understand
why, recall that in the presence of strategic substitutability ﬁrms demand a more precise
private information (see Equation 10), as the latter carries a large weight on ﬁrms’
choices. Furthermore, since α∗ < α, a larger precision of private information is socially
beneﬁcial because it reduces the disproportionately large weight of the public signal.
The cost thresholds c′ = c′′ discriminating between public and private information
for diﬀerent degrees of strategic substitutability are illustrated in Figure 4.31
As expected, and contrary to the ﬁndings for the price setting framework discussed
in Section 7.2 entailing strategic complementarity, under strategic substitutability the
acquisition of private information dominates that of public information for a very large
range of parameter values even for relatively small levels of strategic substitutability
(i.e., for α = −0.3), unless the cost of private information acquisition signiﬁcantly
exceeds that of public information provision. As already noted, this follows from the fact
29Observe that WKK < 0, which guarantees that Assumption 2.1 (iii) is satisﬁed.
30The fact that c
′′ = c
′ follows since Uσσ = UKθ = 0.
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Figure 4: Cost thresholds for diﬀerent values of α in the presence of negative production
externalities
that agents systematically overweight public information in equilibrium since α∗ < α.
Hence, an increase in the precision of private information, by increasing the dispersion
of agents’ actions, is welfare improving; an eﬀect that (as shown in Figure 4) becomes
stronger the larger is the equilibrium degree of strategic substitutability.32
From the analysis above it follows that in a framework characterized by strate-
gic substitutability, the scope for more precise public information is greatly reduced.
Therefore, the pro-transparency recipes that should be used in the presence of strategic
complementarities lose most of their appeal, sending a word of caution to policy makers
as for the value of transparency in environments where negative externalities are likely
to be relevant.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the equilibrium and welfare implications of the interaction
between the use and collection of information. Its main theoretical contribution is
the analysis of the mechanisms behind the choice of public information provision by a
policy maker, and that of private information acquisition by heterogeneous agents.
Our analytical framework rests on a number of assumptions that are needed to
32Models involving positive production externalities would lead to opposite results. For instance,
Angeletos and Pavan (2004) consider a partial equilibrium model of investment complementarities that
entails a positive externality in production inducing strategic complementarities in agents’ actions (con-
sistently with, e.g., Cooper and John, 1988; and Acemoglu, 1993). By encompassing their model in our
framework with costly information, it is easy to show that the private perception of the coordination
motive falls short of the socially optimal one; i.e., α < α
∗. Therefore, it is optimal to increase the coor-
dination of agents’ actions. This goal can be achieved by increasing the precision of public information,
since in taking their decisions private agents assign a lower weight to their private information than
to the public signal (as it is evident from Equation (10)), which would render an increase in private
information an ineﬃcient and costly tool to enhance the coordination of agents’ actions.
26guarantee the analytical tractability of the model. In continuity with most of the liter-
ature, we assume a quadratic speciﬁcation of agents’ utility functions and a Gaussian
information structure. These two assumptions, however, do not seem crucial for our re-
sults, and they may indeed prove a good benchmark also for more general environments
(as noted also by Angeletos and Pavan, 2007).
Speciﬁc to our setup is the assumption of linear costs of information precision. This
hypothesis, besides being useful to guarantee the analytical tractability of the model,
has entirely obvious implications. All our main insights are conﬁrmed when focusing
on isoelastic convex cost functions (see Appendix C). In this case, however, very little
can be proved analytically, requiring us to resort to a computational analysis in order
to disentangle the diﬀerent eﬀects at play.
The concavity of payoﬀs and the uniqueness of equilibrium that are essential in
Angeletos and Pavan’s (2007) setup remain crucial in the derivation of our results
as well. As stressed in their paper, whenever aggregate welfare is convex over some
region, a lottery may be socially preferable to the complete information equilibrium.
In this case, the analysis of the implications of costly information acquisition/provision
is constrained by the negative value associated with more precise private and public
signals.
Generalizing the nature of the shocks we study in this paper is a promising avenue
for future research. All the shocks we consider here share the property that the response
of the economy to a shock under perfect information is eﬃcient. Recent papers (e.g.,
Paciello and Wiederholt, 2010) consider also disturbances – such as the mark-up shocks
in the New-Keyenesian monopolistic competition model – having the property that the
response of the private sector to the shock under perfect information is ineﬃcient. It
would be interesting to investigate whether the pro-transparency results we obtain for
environments with strategic complementarity continue to hold, and to what extent,
when considering shocks with such ‘ineﬃciency property’.
A second interesting extension is to explore the welfare implications of diﬀerent
assumptions on the interplay between the provision of public information and the col-
lection of private information by heterogeneous agents. A deeper understanding of the
ways in which public signals are used by individuals and their implications in terms
of beliefs correlation, as well as of the mechanisms presiding the aggregation of in-
formation, may reveal additional aspects of the interplay between public and private
information that remain unexplored in the current setup.
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29Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Consider any agent i. Solving problem (2), we ﬁnd that
the individual best response function of agent i to other agents’ actions is






E [K | x,y] −
Ukθ
Ukk
E [θ | x,y] (A.1)
that, by using the deﬁnitions of α, κ1 and κ0, can be rewritten as in (3).
(ii) Following the equilibrium reasoning in Morris and Shin (2002), suppose that
k(x,y) = a + bx + cz,
for some {a,b,c} ∈ R. Then K (θ,y) = a+bθ+cz. By substituting k(x,y) and K (θ,y)
into (3) we obtain: a = κ0, b = κ1 (1 − γ), and c = κ1γ with γ = δ
1−α(1−δ), which proves
the claim.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Observe that agent j has zero-measure. The equilibrium
value of γ when all agents i other than j choose a precision pxi = px is given by (4).




k(x,y)dP (x | θ,y) = κ0 + κ1 (γz + (1 − γ)θ). (A.2)
By substituting Equation (A.2) into the ﬁrst order condition of agent j’s utility maxi-
mization problem, we obtain her best response to other agents’ actions; i.e.,
kj (xj,y) = −
Uk
Ukk
+ α(κ0 + κ1 (γz + (1 − γ)E [θ | xj,y])) + κ1 (1 − α)E [θ | xj,y].
Recalling that − Uk
Ukk = κ0 (1 − α), we can write
kj (xj,y) = κ0 + κ1 (1 − αγ)E [θ | xj,y] + κ1αγz, (A.3)
in which
E [θ | xj,y] = δjz + (1 − δj)xj. (A.4)
Rearranging, (A.3) reduces to
kj (xj,y) = κ0 + κ1 (γjz + (1 − γj)xj),
where
γj = (1 − αγ)δj + αγ. (A.5)
By substituting into Equation (A.5) the expression for γ given in Equation (4), we
obtain
γj =
(1 − α)δj + αδ
1 − α(1 − δ)
,
which proves the claim.
30Derivation of individual ex-ante expected utility (Equation 8). The ex-ante
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In period −1, agent j knows that in period 0 all agents i ∈ [0,1], i  = j, will play
the linear equilibrium strategy (5), so that the average action K will be given by (A.2).
Moreover, agent j anticipates that she will play her optimal best reply (6) when all
other agents play the linear equilibrium strategy described in Proposition (3.1).
Exploiting Equations (A.2) and (6) to substitute for K and kj, respectively, into
the terms of degree 1 in Equation (A.6), we obtain
E [Ukkj + UKK + Uθθ] = Uk (κ0 + κ1θ−1) + UK (κ0 + κ1θ−1) + Uθθ−1. (A.7)
Because we consider the period −1 expectation, the linear terms in (A.7) are inde-
pendent of the signals, and hence of their variances and of the weights γ and γj.































pθ+py, we have that z = E [θ|y] = (1 − λ)θ−1 + λy. Recalling that





























Taking the unconditional expectation, exploiting the deﬁnition of λ, and recalling that
























































Focus now on E [UkKkjK] = UkKE [kjK]. By exploiting Equations (A.2) and (6)
to substitute for K and kj, respectively, we obtain
UkKE [(κ0 + κ1 (γjz + (1 − γj)xj))(κ0 + κ1 (γz + (1 − γ)θ))].








1E [(ϕ + γj (λε − (1 − λ)ϕ) + (1 − γj)ξj)(ϕ + γ (λε − (1 − λ)ϕ))]
 
























The computation of E
 
UKKK2 
, E [Ukθkjθ], and E [UKθKθ] requires only marginal
variations of the above procedure. We start with E
 
UKKK2 
that, by substituting for
K, can be written as
UKKE
 







0 + 2κ0κ1θ−1 + κ2
1E
 







































As for E [Ukθkjθ], we have
UkθE [(κ0 + κ1 (γjz + (1 − γj)xj))θ] =






















Finally, for E [UKθKθ], we obtain
UKθE [(κ0 + κ1 (γz + (1 − γ)θ))θ] =











































32Because agent j has zero-measure, exploiting Equations (A.2) and (5), the disper-









[κ1 (1 − γ)(xi − θ)]
2 di.








We collect all the terms that are independent of the variances of signals and of the
weights γ and γj in the term


























By exploiting Equations (A.8) - (A.12) and using the deﬁnition of σ2
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which is Equation (8) in the main text.











when γj takes the value given in Equation (7). By equating to zero the derivative of















33that, by making use of the fact that α ≡ −
UkK








Recalling that δj ≡
pz
pz+pxj
and γ = δ
1−α(1−δ), the above equation can be rewritten as
γj =
(1 − α)δj + αδ
1 − α(1 − δ)
,
which proves the claim.










− cpr = 0.
Using (7), we have that 1 − γj =
(1−α)(1−δj)
1−α(1−δ) , which – by exploiting the deﬁnition of δj
and recalling that δ ≡
pz












(px + pz)(1 − α)
pz + (1 − α)px
− pz,
which proves the claim.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. The result is immediate from the ﬁrst order condition with







= WK + WKKK + WKθθ.
Recall that the second order condition of the maximization problem holds by As-
sumption 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. The Lagrangian corresponding to the maximization prob-















x k(x,y)dP (x | θ,y)
 








x [k(x,y) − K (θ,y)]
2 dP (x | θ,y)
 
dP (θ | y).
By Assumption 2.1 it is WKK < 0 and Wσσ < 0, so that the program is concave. The
solution is given by the ﬁrst-order conditions for k(x,y), K (θ,y), and σ2
k (θ,y) that,
by making use of Deﬁnition (11), can be written respectively as:
 
θ
[Uk + Ukkk(x,y) + UkKK (θ,y) + Ukθθ − λ(θ,y)+ (A.13)





[UK + UKKK (θ,y) + UkKk(x,y) + UKθθ]dP (x | θ,y) (A.14)
+λ(θ,y) + 2η (θ,y)
 
x
[k(x,y) − K (θ,y)]dP (x | θ,y)
 







dP (x | θ,y) + η (θ,y)
 
dP (θ | y) = 0, (A.15)
where in formulating Equation (A.13) we make use of the fundamental lemma on condi-
tional probability (see, e.g., Grimmet and Stirzaker, 1992).33 By focusing on (A.14), it
is immediate to see that
 
x [k(x,y) − K (θ,y)]dP (x | θ,y) = 0. Accordingly, Equation
(A.14) can be rewritten as
 
θ
[UK + (UKK + UkK)K (θ,y) + UKθθ + λ(θ,y)]dP (θ | y) = 0. (A.16)
Noting that by Equation (A.15) it must be Uσσ = −2η (θ,y) for all θ and y, and
substituting this expression together with (A.16) into (A.13), we obtain
 
θ
[Uk + UK + Ukkk(x,y) + (UKK + 2UkK)K (θ,y) + (Ukθ + UKθ)θ+ (A.17)
+Uσσ (k (x,y) − K (θ,y))]dP (θ | x,y) = 0.
Since the program in Deﬁnition 5.1 is quadratic, it is natural to assume that k(x,y)
and K (θ,y) are linear in their arguments; i.e.,




k(x,y)dP (x | θ,y) = a + bθ + cz, (A.19)
where, as discussed in Section 2, z =
pθθ−1+pyy
pθ+py . By substituting (A.18) and (A.19) into
(A.17), and recalling that
 
θ θdP (θ | x,y) = δz +(1 − δ)x, after some algebra we have
Uk + UK + Ukk (a + bx + cz) + (UKK + 2UkK)(a + b(δz + (1 − δ)x) + cz)+
+(Ukθ + UKθ)(δz + (1 − δ)x) + Uσσbδ (x − z) = 0.







WKθ (1 − δ)












33By repeatedly applying the fundamental lemma, we obtain:
dP (x | θ,y)dP (θ | y) =
dP (x,θ,y)
dP (θ,y)






dP (θ | x,y)dP (x,y)
dP(y)
=
= dP (θ | x,y)dP (x | y).
35in which WKK ≡ Ukk + 2UkK + UKK, WKθ ≡ Ukθ + UKθ, and Wσσ ≡ Ukk + Uσσ.
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator in the expression of b by WKK, and
exploiting the deﬁnition of κ∗




(1 − δ) + δ Wσσ
WKK
.
Finally, using Deﬁnitions (15) and (17), we can write
b = κ∗
1
(1 − α∗)(1 − δ)
1 − α∗ (1 − δ)
= κ∗
1 (1 − γ∗). (A.20)











(1 − α∗)(1 − δ)
1 − α∗ (1 − δ)
 
.
Since the deﬁnition of α∗ guarantees that Wσσ
WKK −1 = α∗
1−α∗, the expression above reduces
to c = κ∗
1γ∗. Therefore:
k∗ (x,y) = κ∗
0 + κ∗
1 ((1 − γ∗)x + γ∗z).
Accordingly, the allocation (16) is eﬃcient and unique within the class of linear allo-
cations. Since this allocation coincides with the solution obtained in Angeletos and
Pavan (2007), it is globally unique.
Derivation of the ex-ante welfare criterion (Equation 19). Substituting Equa-
tion (12) in the welfare criterion (18), and exploiting both the expression of K(θ,y) in
Deﬁnition 5.1 and the agents’ equilibrium strategies (5), we obtain:
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(θ−1 + λ(ϕ + ε))
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, where λ is deﬁned as py/(py + pθ) = py/pz. The information structure
detailed in Section (2) implies that E [zθ|θ−1] = θ2
−1+λp−1
θ , and that E [xθ|θ−1] = θ2
−1+
p−1













θ . Accordingly, Equation (A.21) becomes































































C (pxi)di − C (pz).
36Collecting all the terms that are independent of signals precisions, and letting



































































C (pxi)di − C (pz).
By separating the addenda involving pθ and py, the term multiplied by 1
2WKKκ2
1 in the












































Moreover, by recalling that WKθ = −WKKκ∗
























Accordingly, Equation (A.22) becomes
































C (pxi)di − C (pz),










collects all the addenda that are independent of
public and private precisions. Equation (19) in the main text follows immediately.
37Proof of Proposition 6.1. To ease the analysis of the two cases in the proposition,
we ﬁrst study the problem of optimal public information provision when no private
information is acquired.
By inspection of Equation (10) it is immediate to see that p∗






2cpr or, recalling that pz = py + pθ, if and only if







which is non-negative by Assumption 6.3. Since in this case it is p∗
x = 0, the policy
maker chooses py by maximizing (20) under the constraint py ≥ ¯ py. Denoting with ψ




2 − cpb + ψ = 0,









cpb − pθ > ¯ py when cpb/cpr < c′
¯ py when cpb/cpr ≥ c′
, (A.24)
where we denote with ˆ py the optimum of the policy maker’s problem in the interval
py ∈ [¯ py,∞). Note that ˆ py > 0 by Assumption 6.3.
Turning to the case of private information acquisition of positive precision, whenever












Given private agents’ behavior, substituting for p∗
x and after some algebra, the social
welfare function (22) can be written as
W (θ−1,p∗





























Denote with ζ and µ the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the two constraints
py ≥ 0 and py ≤ ¯ py, respectively. Taking the ﬁrst order condition of the policy maker’s








cpr − cpb + ζ − µ ≥ 0,
38which can immediately be rewritten as
c′′cpr − cpb + ζ − µ ≥ 0,








. Denote by ˇ py the optimum of the policy maker’s
problem in py ∈ [0, ¯ py], and suppose that ζ > 0 and µ = 0. Then, it must be








1−α. Conversely, suppose that ζ = 0
and µ > 0, then it must be cpb/cpr ≤ c′′ so that ˇ py = ¯ py, and hence p∗
x = 0.
We can now solve for a global maximum of the policy maker’s problem. We focus
ﬁrst on Case 1; i.e., c′′ < c′. The proof of the claim is in three steps.
Step 1. Suppose that cpb/cpr < c′′, a case which is relevant only when c′′ > 0.
Both the relevant social welfare function in the interval py ∈ [0, ¯ py] – given in Equation
(A.25) – and that in the interval py ∈ [¯ py, ˆ py] – given in Equation (20) – are increasing
in py (see Panel (a) in Figure A.1). The fact that ˆ py > ¯ py follows from cpb/cpr < c′′ < c′.
Note that at py = ¯ py the social welfare functions (A.25) and (20) take the same value
because for both functions it is p∗
x = 0. Accordingly, the welfare-maximizing level of
public information precision is given by p∗
y = ˆ py, and agents do not acquire any private
information, i.e. p∗
x = 0.
Panel (a) : cpb/cpr < ccc Panel (b) : ccc  cpb/cpr< cc Panel (c) : cpb/cpr  cc
(.) W (.) W (.) W






Figure A.1: Alternative behaviors of the welfare function
Step 2. Consider now the case c′′ ≤ cpb/cpr < c′. When cpb/cpr = c′′, the
maximum of the social welfare function (A.25) is lower than that of the welfare function
(20). This result follows since the function (A.25) is constant in py (ζ = µ = 0), while
(20) has a maximum at ˆ py > ¯ py since cpb/cpr < c′ and the values of the two social
welfare functions match at py = ¯ py. Conversely, in the limit case in which cpb/cpr = c′,
the maximum welfare is attained at p∗
y = ˇ py = 0. This follows directly from the
observations that the social welfare function (A.25) is decreasing in py for py ∈ [0, ¯ py]
– because cpb/cpr > c′′ – while (20) is non-increasing in py for py ∈ [¯ py,∞), and that
the values of the two social welfare functions match at py = ¯ py.
The reasoning above ensures that for c′′ ≤ cpb/cpr < c′ we only need to compare the
value of the social welfare function (A.25) computed at ˇ py = 0, with that of the welfare
function (20) computed at py = ˆ py. These two local maxima are depicted in Panel
39(b) of Figure A.1. Substituting for (A.24), we obtain that the maximum of the social
welfare (20) in py ∈ [¯ py,∞) is






∂cpb < 0 if Assumption 6.3 holds. Note that, because
cpb/cpr > c′′, the maximum value of the social welfare function (A.25) in py ∈ [0, ¯ py] is
given by ˇ py = 0, so that
W (θ−1,p∗



























∂cpb = 0. Therefore, there exists a threshold ˜ c(cpb), c′′ ≤
˜ c(cpb) < c′, such that the optimal choice of precision by the policy maker switches from
p∗
y = ˆ py to p∗
y = ˇ py = 0 at ˜ c(cpb). Note also that, for c′′ < 0, we have ˜ c(cpb) ≥ 0 if
κ∗
1 ≥ κ1; a condition that is stronger than the one required by Assumption 6.2. In fact,
a necessary condition for c′′ to be negative is α∗ < α, which discourages the provision
of public information.
Step 3. Finally, suppose that cpb/cpr ≥ c′. In this case, the maximum of the
social welfare function (A.25) lies above that of the social welfare function (20). To
prove it, observe that the social welfare (A.25) is decreasing in py for py ∈ [0, ¯ py] – since
cpb/cpr > c′′ – and (20) is non-increasing in py for py > ¯ py – as cpb/cpr ≥ c′. Because
the two welfare functions take the same value at py = ¯ py, it must be that the welfare
function (A.25) takes values larger than the maximum of (20), as shown in Panel (c)
of Figure A.1. Thus, the policy maker does not provide a public signal of positive
precision (i.e., p∗










Finally, we study Case 2 (i.e., c′ ≤ c′′), relying on the three steps above. We consider
ﬁrst the case cpb/cpr < c′ ≤ c′′, which is essentially equivalent to that studied in
Step 1 above, so that p∗
x = 0 and p∗
y = ˆ py. Second, consider c′ ≤ cpb/cpr < c′′.
In this case, the social welfare function (A.25) is increasing in py for py < ¯ py since
cpb/cpr < c′′, while the social welfare function (20) is non-increasing in py for py > ¯ py,
as cpb/cpr ≥ c′. Hence, the precision of the public signal is given by the constrained
optimum p∗
y = ¯ py, and p∗
x = 0. Finally, we assume that c′ ≤ c′′ ≤ cpb/cpr, which
coincides with Step 3 in the proof of Case 1. The social welfare function (A.25) is non-
increasing in py as cpb/cpr ≥ c′′, and the social welfare function (20) is non-increasing
in py since cpb/cpr ≥ c′. As the two functions take the same value at py = ¯ py, it must
be that p∗









40Appendix B. A model of price setting complementarities
We study an economy inhabited by a continuum of agents i ∈ [0,1], each of whom
consumes a basket Ci and is the unique producer of a ﬁnal good Yi. Being a monopolist
in the production of Yi, agent i chooses its price pi. Abstracting from the cost of
information acquisition, the consumer-producer utility function can be written as
U (θ,C,Yi) = J (Ci) − θV (Yi), (B.1)
where J (Ci) denotes the utility of consumption and V (Yi) the disutility of labor.34
Note that JC (Ci) > 0, JCC (Ci) < 0, limCi→∞ J (Ci) = 0, VY (Yi) > 0 and VY Y (Yi) >
0. The expected value of the labor supply shock, θ−1, is denoted for notational conve-
nience with ¯ θ > 0. Our setup is close to those of Hellwig (2005) and Adam (2007), but
for the fact that we assume that each consumer i is the sole producer of good i. This
assumption aligns individual utilities and social welfare, deﬁned as the integral sum of
individual utilities as in Angeletos and Pavan (2007).35
Prices are set at the beginning of each period, after agents have received both the
public and the private signal, but before production and consumption choices are made.











obtained by means of the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, where chi denotes the
consumption of good h by consumer i, and v > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution

















She chooses her consumption basket under the budget constraint
Ci ≤ (1 + τ)
pi
P
Yi − T, (B.5)
in which τ denotes an output subsidy aimed at neutralizing the monopolistic distortion,
and T is a lump-sum tax balancing the subsidy.
34More precisely, we should write V (Li) rather than V (Yi). The formulation in (B.1) is implied by
the assumption of a linear production function (i.e., Yi = Li), which is standard in this literature.
35Roca (2006), following Woodford (2003), assumes that each agent supplies a speciﬁc type of labor
that is used in every sector of the economy. This hypothesis could be accommodated for in our
framework as well.
41We deﬁne by Y the economy-wide production level obtained as the integral sum of







By aggregating the demand functions of the generic good h (Equation B.4) over all







By substituting Equation (B.7) into the budget constraint (B.5) taken with equality,














which allows us to get the following ﬁrst order approximation of (B.2),
Ci − ¯ Y = v (P − p)
¯ Y
¯ P
+ v(P − pi)
¯ Y
¯ P
+ Y − ¯ Y ,
where ¯ Y denotes the non stochastic aggregate production level in equilibrium, and
the production subsidy has been used to oﬀset the monopolistic distortion (i.e., τ =
1
v−1), and p =
 
[0,1] pidi denotes the average price. Notice that – by using the price
aggregator in (B.3) – we have that P = p − vσ2








variance of individual prices, normalized using the non-stochastic aggregate price level
in equilibrium (i.e., ¯ P). Accordingly, we can write
Ci − ¯ Y = v
 





  ¯ Y
¯ P




p ¯ Y . (B.9)
We summarize the inﬂuence of the monetary policy on output by the quantity equation
PY = ¯ M that implies Y − ¯ Y = −
 
P − ¯ P




p ¯ P/2 − ¯ P
  ¯ Y / ¯ P. Therefore, Equation (B.9) becomes
Ci − ¯ Y = v
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p ¯ Y . (B.10)
Using similar arguments, it is easy to derive from Equation (B.7) the ﬁrst order ap-
proximation









p ¯ P − ¯ P






p ¯ Y . (B.11)
Following the literature (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003), we focus on a second order approx-
imation of the utility function (B.1) around the non stochastic equilibrium {¯ Y , ¯ P, ¯ θ};
i.e.,
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due to the eﬀect of the production
subsidy τ = 1
v−1, and using Equations (B.10) and (B.11), we can write











p ¯ Y − V
 ¯ Y
  



































where all the terms of order higher than one have been omitted.








all terms that are constant or linear in θ, p, and pi, we
obtain












































which can be rewritten as






































with ω ≡ −(JCC(¯ Y)−¯ θVY Y(¯ Y))¯ Y
JC(¯ Y) > 0. Note that, as it is standard in this literature (see,
e.g., Hellwig, 2005; Roca, 2006), the variance of individual prices has a negative impact
on utility due to the Dixit-Stiglitz’s setup.
By rewriting the utility (B.12) using the notation adopted in the main text (i.e.,
p/ ¯ P = K, pi/ ¯ P = ki, and σ2
p = σ2
k) and by taking into account information acquisition
costs, we obtain Equation (25).
Appendix C. Cost convexities
The result of Proposition 6.1 – that public and private signals of positive precision
do not coexist – depends crucially on the linearity of precision costs. Although this
assumption captures theoretically interesting cases, and makes the model analytically
tractable, it is undeniably quite restrictive. It is easy to see that, under more general
43convex cost functions, public and private signals of positive precisions typically coexist.
In fact, as in this case the marginal costs of information precisions are increasing, it is
never optimal for the policy maker to provide a level of precision so large that private
agents acquire no information at all. For the same reason, it is always optimal for
the policy maker to provide public information of strictly positive precision, as not
providing any public signal would impose a too high marginal cost on private agents.
The main drawback of assuming strictly convex cost functions is that it becomes im-
possible to investigate the implications of information provision/acquisition by means
of analytical tools only. In this Appendix we reconsider – by resorting to numerical
simulations – beauty contests, price setting complementarities and negative externali-
ties, showing that the results obtained under convex cost speciﬁcations are qualitatively
analogous to the analytic results derived in the main text for the case of linear costs.
In particular, in all applications below we consider the isoelastic cost functions











with η > 1.
‘Beauty Contests’
We adopt the same setup of Section 7.1 but for the fact that we substitute the linear
costs in Equation (24) with the convex cost functions (C.1). We investigate by means
of numerical simulations the eﬀects of diﬀerent degrees of coordination (α) on the ratio
between the optimal precisions of public and private information (i.e. py/px). We also
explore the implications for this ratio of diﬀerent cost functions convexities (η) and
of diﬀerent relative costs of information precision (as stemming from diﬀerent ratios
cpb/cpr). Figure C.1 illustrates the results of our analysis.36
Figure C.1: Morris and Shin’s beauty contest
In all simulations the precision of the fundamental, pθ, is exogenously given and set
to a level of 20 so that the variance of the fundamental is 5%.37 Panel (a) of Figure C.1
36As it is impossible to fully characterize the ﬁrst and second order conditions of the optimization
problems under investigation, our routines compute the welfare levels for a wide range of parameters,
subsequently choosing the largest one.
37This assumption bears no implications on the qualitative features of the simulations results.
44shows the optimal ratio of public vs. private information precisions as a function of α,
under the assumption that cpb = cpr and letting η ∈ {1.4, 1.7, 2}. It is immediate to
see that the ratio py/px increases with the privately perceived degree of coordination,
and hence also with the diﬀerence between α and the optimal degree of coordination
α∗ (that is equal to zero). This happens because each agent’s evaluation of her private
information is decreasing in α. In the limiting case in which α = 1, private information
is useless as it plays no role in the estimation of the fundamental.
To understand why the two types of information typically coexist, recall ﬁrst that
with linear costs private and public information precisions are linearly substitutable
(as shown in Equation (10)). This substitutability relationship is preserved for the
cost functions (C.1), becoming however a convex one. The shape of the cost function
implies in fact that the private cost savings induced by an increase in the precision of
the public signal are smaller the larger is the precision of public information. Hence,
from an individual standpoint, the beneﬁt of acquiring a less precise private information
decreases with the precision of public information. Focusing now on the behavior of the
policy maker, it is easy to see that she would never provide a public signal suﬃciently
precise to entirely oﬀset the acquisition of private information, as this would turn out
to be too costly. At the same time, however, she always provides a public signal of
some positive precision, since for low levels of py (large px), a reduction of px would
entail substantial cost savings for the agents due to cost convexity.
Panel (a) of Figure C.1 also shows that the ratio py/px decreases in η. To see why
this is the case, recall that in a beauty contest private information is less ‘valuable’ than
public information, which together with cpb = cpr explains why in all our simulations
we obtain py > px. Since py > px, an increase in the convexity of the cost functions
reduces the optimal amount of public information provision because the marginal cost
of py becomes larger than that of px.
Panel (b) of Figure C.1 shows the eﬀects of diﬀerent values of the cpb/cpr ratio
(i.e., cpb/cpr ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5}) for given η (η = 1.5). From a qualitative point
of view, the results of the exercise are unsurprising: the lower the relative cost, the
higher the ratio py/px. However, in a quantitative perspective, the results we obtain
are quite strong. Even when the precision of public information is much costlier than
that of private information (e.g., cpb/cpr = 2.5), the level of public information provision
remains larger than that of private information also for relatively small values of α (i.e.,
α ≥ 0.71).38 In this perspective, the results of the numerical analysis support the strong
pro-transparency message already drawn for the linear costs case.
Price setting complementarity and transparency
We study the same model of Section 7.2, but for the substitution of the linear costs
used in Equation (25) with the isoelastic cost functions (C.1). Our numerical exercises
are based on the same assumptions about the cost ratio cpb/cpr and η that we made
in the beauty contest case discussed above. As for the parametrization of the utility
function, consistently with the assumption made when illustrating the model in Section
38Obviously, a reduction of the cost ratio below 1 induces a remarkable increase in the acquisition
of public information precision. Note also that when cpb/cpr = 2.5 and α = r = 0.5, the ratio py/px
reaches its lowest level of 0.34.
457.2 for the case of linear costs, we set ω = 4 and we normalize ¯ θ = 1.
Figure C.2: Information precision and price coordination
Panel (a) of Figure C.2 plots the optimal ratio py/px for α ∈ (0,1) – i.e., v ∈ (1,∞)
– showing that it is increasing in the degree of price coordination. As in the beauty
contest case, this ﬁnding follows from the fact that private information becomes less
valuable in the estimation of the fundamental the larger is α.39 Moreover, analogously
to what already discussed in the previous sub-section, it is immediate from Panel (a)
that the ‘convexity eﬀect’ in the privately perceived rate of substitution between the
accuracies of private and public information reduces the optimal precision of public
information. Finally, Panel (b), drawn for η = 1.5, illustrates the same eﬀect of the
relative cost on the precisions of public and private information already highlighted for
the beauty contest case, conﬁrming once more the social value of a more precise public
information in the presence of strategic complementarities.
Negative Production Externalities
Figure C.3 illustrates the results of the numerical analysis on the model of Section
7.3 with the isoelastic cost functions (C.1). The simulations are based on the same
assumptions about the cost ratio cpb/cpr and η that have been made in the previous
two applications. Furthermore, consistently with the hypothesis in Section 7.3 for the
case of linear costs, we have set ω = 4 and χ = 0, and normalized ¯ θ to one.
Panel (a) of Figure C.3 plots the optimal ratio py/px for α ∈ [−1,0], showing that
py/px is (signiﬁcantly) smaller than 1 for all values of α < 0. This result is strikingly
diﬀerent with respect to that obtained in the two applications above dealing with
strategic complementarities. The presence of a negative externality induces strategic
substitutability between agents’ actions, which implies that private information carries
a larger weight on agents’ choices than public information. As it is evident from panel
(a) in the Figure, this eﬀect holds for all values of α smaller than zero, and it is
39Similarly to the case of investment complementarities studied by Angeletos and Pavan (2004), this
eﬀect adds to the one implied by the wedge between the privately perceived and the optimal motives
for coordination.
46Figure C.3: Information precision and negative externalities
quantitatively relevant also for small values of the cost elasticity (η − 1). Moreover,
py/px is increasing in the degree of substitutability of agents’ actions. This follows as
usual from the fact that private information becomes less valuable in the estimation of
the fundamental the larger is α. As it is to be expected, when α = 0, we have that
py = px for any η since cpb = cpr. In this case, in fact, the externality has no impact
on utility and welfare.
Panel (b) of Figure C.3 illustrates once more the well understood eﬀect of the
relative cost on the precisions of public and private information. Note that the results
illustrated in Figure C.3 conﬁrm, for the case of cost convexities, the policy implications
discussed in Section 7.3 under the assumption of linear cost functions; namely that in
the presence of strategic substitutability a more precise public information may often
be welfare reducing.
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